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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lawrence Scott Andrus appeals from the district court’s order denying his Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In Andrus’s previous appeal, the Court of Appeals summarized this case’s procedural
history and factual background as follows:
In the underlying criminal case, Andrus was charged with felony driving
under the influence of alcohol. At trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Andrus
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which was denied by the district court.
Andrus appealed and this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the
sentence. Thereafter, Andrus filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In
response, the district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, pursuant to Idaho
Code § 19-4906(b). The district court granted a motion for extension of time, but
Andrus failed to reply within the thirty-day extension. The district court
dismissed Andrus’s petition for post-conviction relief with prejudice….
Andrus v. State, Docket No. 44686, Unpublished Op. No. 335, pp.1-2 (Idaho App., January 24,
2018). Andrus timely appealed, id. at 2, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
summary dismissal of Andrus’s petition for post-conviction relief, id. at 4.
While his appeal was pending, Andrus also filed a motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (R., pp.153-55.) The district court denied the
motion. (R., pp.160-64.) Andrus filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.171-75.)
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ISSUE
Andrus states the issue on appeal as:
I.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Andrus’ motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Andrus failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 60(b) motion?
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ARGUMENT
Andrus Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His
Rule 60(b) Motion
A.

Introduction
Andrus asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

relief from judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (Appellant’s brief, pp.513.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows no abuse of the
district court’s discretion. The district court’s order denying relief should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s dismissal of motions brought under Rule 60(b) is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 578, 212 P.3d 1001, 1008 (2009).

C.

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Andrus’ Rule 60(b)
Motion For Relief From Judgment
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final

judgment or order for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
I.R.C.P. 60(b). “Although the district court has broad discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b)
motion, the motion may be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling
circumstances.” Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003) (citing Miller
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v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607, 610 (1996)). Moreover, the party seeking relief
must also “show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a
meritorious defense to the action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870
P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994).
Below (and on appeal) Andrus claimed that his post-conviction counsel offered a
complete absence of meaningful representation when he failed to file an amended petition or to
respond to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss Andrus’s petition, and that this
constituted unique and compelling circumstances. (R., pp.153-55; Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)
The district court reviewed the record and relevant case law, and determined that Andrus had not
demonstrated unique or compelling circumstances.

(R., pp.162-64.)

As the district court

recognized, in both Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010), and Berg, supra, counsels’
lack of meaningful representation resulted in the respective petitioner’s complaints being
dismissed without consideration of the merits of their respective claims. (R., pp.162-63.) In
contrast, the claims Andrus raised in his petition for post-conviction relief were not dismissed
due to counsel’s failure to prosecute the petition, or even because they were merely bare and
conclusory. (Id.) Rather, even assuming counsel’s alleged lack of participation, Andrus’s claims
were still considered and dismissed on their merits. (Id.; see also R., pp.86-97.)
The district court noted that counsel had a duty to communicate with Andrus, but also
recognized that unless communication could have avoided dismissal on the merits, a failure to
communicate would be harmless. (R., p.162, n.2.) Andrus failed to present any evidence, or
make an argument, that there were additional facts or legal authority that might have prevented
summary dismissal of his petition on its merits. (R., pp.163-64.) Therefore, Andrus failed to
show any unique or compelling circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b). See Ponderosa
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Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317-18, 870 P.2d at 670-71 (“It would be pointless to vacate a
summary judgment and reopen the proceeding if the party seeking relief has not shown that it
can raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion.”).
On appeal, Andrus asserts that his undeveloped claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel might have been better developed with more diligent representation in post-conviction
proceedings, and that this constitutes unique and compelling circumstances. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.10-12.) Andrus’s argument fails.
Andrus asserts that he had a meritorious claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to suppress Andrus’s breath test results. (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) After taking judicial notice of
the underlying proceedings (R., pp.83-84), the district court directly and fully addressed the
merits of this contention in its notice of intent to dismiss Andrus’s post-conviction petition (R.,
pp.90-91).

As the district court noted, where the petitioner alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion would not have been granted
by the trial court is dispositive of the issue. (R., p.91 (citing Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 477,
180 P.3d 511, 516 (Ct. App. 2008).) The district court correctly determined that a motion to
suppress would have been denied based on the Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Stump, 146
Idaho 857, 860, 203 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ct. App. 2009), that an officer is not required to “stare
fixedly” at the subject during the 15-minute waiting period, but may rely on his or her other
senses, which the officer was in a position to do in Andrus’s underlying case. (R., p.91.) Thus,
Andrus’s claim was correctly dismissed on its merits, and Andrus failed in his Rule 60(b) motion
to allege any facts demonstrating that counsel—whether active or not—would have had any
impact on that outcome.
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Andrus also argues that his claim, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her
closing arguments when she noted that Andrus was manipulative, was meritorious. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.11-12.) It was not. First, “[a]n application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute
for an appeal.” Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997). Prosecutorial
misconduct, even if not objected to, is an issue that may be (and routinely is) raised on direct
appeal, and any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited
and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings.” I.C. § 19-4901(b). Second, the
district court, after quoting from the transcript of the proceedings below and applying the correct
legal standards, fully addressed this issue on its merits as well. (R., p.95.) Andrus failed to show
in his Rule 60(b) motion that additional filings from counsel would have had any impact on the
ultimate outcome of this claim. 1
The district court properly exercised its discretion when it denied Andrus’s motion for
relief under Rule 60(b) because, contrary to his assertions on appeal, Andrus failed to show
unique and compelling circumstances supporting his motion. Andrus has failed to show an
abuse of the district court’s discretion. The district court’s order denying Andrus’s Rule 60(b)
motion should be affirmed.

1

Andrus also asserts that his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
witnesses to rebut the officer’s testimony was supported by the record, but he does not develop
this argument. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) Regardless, the district court correctly
addressed and dismissed this claim on its merits as well. (R., pp.92-93.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Andrus’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer________________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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